

BOOK REVIEWS

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ISSA J. BOULLATA, ED., *Literary Structures of Religious Meaning in the Qur'an*, Curzon Studies [in the Qur'an] (Richmond, Surrey, U.K.: Curzon Press, 2000). Pp. 405. £60.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY TODD LAWSON, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal

Now we're getting somewhere. This collection of fifteen studies on the general topic indicated in the carefully worded title is one of the more enjoyable reading experiences in Qur'anic studies of recent memory. A wide variety of problems and subjects are treated in the key of deep and engaged appreciation for the powerful artistry of the Qur'an. The articles are divided into three major groups. The first comprises studies of specific or peculiar modes of "religious meaning." Sells discusses here again the relationship uniting spirit, gender, and aurality as a vehicle of meaning; Zahniser addresses the problem of the unity of the sura by examining what he takes to be transitional passages in two longer chapters; McAuliffe revisits Q.3:7 but this time tries to connect implications of the earliest *tafsir* of this verse with some recent developments in literary criticism; Welch explicates commonalities among various punishment narratives; Rippin succinctly meditates on the implications of *wajh Allāh*, for individual responsibility (it may be helpful here to read for the prepositional, rather than nominal, content of "face of God"—namely, "direction of God"); and Shahid attempts, in novel terms, to unravel the secret of the mysterious disconnected letters.

The second section presents four quite different approaches to four different suras. Again, the controversial problem of the unity of the sura is privileged and either tacitly or explicitly argued. Neuwirth's article, despite numerous Germanisms and other editorial lapses, is a careful and welcome revision of formative "European" Qur'anic studies. Although it is not totally persuasive, it is nevertheless extremely suggestive as an attempt to read the Qur'an (in this case, *Sūrat al-Hijr*) as a witness to the career of the historical Muhammad and the development of the earliest community. Mustansir Mir's discussion of what might have been assumed the infelicitous topic of Qur'anic irony is quite successful. But it could have been even more successful had some further use been made of the insights and technical terminology of English literary criticism and poetics. No attempt is made here to study what must undoubtedly be the highly generative relationship in the text at hand (*Sūrat Yūsuf*) between verbal and dramatic irony. Johns's evocative piece on the intimate interplay of spiritual and literary values in *Sūrat al-Furqān* is a typically sensitive reading from this scholar. The last article in this section is a tour de force of literary criticism à lá Qur'anic studies (or vice versa). A new and very welcome voice in Qur'anic studies, Hajjaji-Jarrah takes the reader into the very eye of the *Sūrat al-Ādiyāt*, and with consummate reading and expressive art allows one to experience the synesthetic music (in English) and unique *Strum und Drang* of a Qur'anic drama as exemplified in this exquisite tone poem where paganism and ethical monotheism meet.

The third and final section offers five articles on the topic of the history of the appreciation of the art of the Qur'an. Needless to say, these articles deal with Arabophone Muslim authors and their works. Kermani sifts through the *Sīra* and other similar texts to list statements from friend and foe attesting to the overwhelming power of the heard Qur'an. Rahman treats us to an expert appreciation of Ibn Qutayba's *Ta'wil mushkil al-Qur'an* in which he highlights the

author's creativity and originality. (However, in the process he expends surprising energy in arguing against an unpublished McGill master's thesis). Two articles are dedicated to the influential but heretofore unsung work of the great Shi'i compromiser al-Sharif al-Radi. Ayoub offers a beautifully written general appreciation of his work, while Abu-Deeb compares his *Talkhis al-bayan fi majazat al-Qur'an* and *al-Majazat al-nabawiyya* with Abu 'Ubayda's *al-Majaz*. Boullata's survey of the life and work of the hero-martyr Sayyid Qutb will provide the student and comparativist with much food for thought on a variety of questions. Undoubtedly, one will be the Socratic confusion inspired by the image of "Muslim fundamentalist" as sophisticated litterateur. Boullata demonstrates that the most powerful and popular modern Qur'an commentary (which, we are told, is not really a *tafsir*) is written by a man whose obvious first and deepest love is language itself. That this love seems to suggest and reflect the Sufi tradition (surely, *al-maniq al-wijdānī* is "illuminated" rather than "emotional logic") is a topic left for another time.

A number of questions relating to both spirit and form naturally arise from reading this collection, most compellingly in the two studies of al-Sharif al-Radi. As Ayoub points out, this Shi'i (Twelver) author lived and wrote during the so-called Shi'i century. But neither Ayoub nor Abu-Deeb addresses the serious question of the relationship between al-Sharif's literary tastes and preoccupations with contemporary "religious" developments. Although the latter comes quite close in one passage, where he speaks of al-Sharif's commentary on Q.16:69, and the "metaphor" of the bees, we are not really informed that, in the same passage, al-Sharif actually subverts traditional—that is, original—imami *tafsir* by insisting that the bees are the ulema of the Shi'i community and not the holy imams, as had been taught heretofore. Not only does such an omission vitiate the greater achievement of this excellent article; it also prevents us from observing that however original al-Sharif al-Radi's literary acumen and taste obviously were, there was indeed a strong precedent for it in what might be called a proto-*akhbārī* exegetical tradition and its attendant metaphorical reading of reality as such. This fact is bound to be of interest for an appreciation of the achievement of the compiler and codifier of the incomparable *Nahj al-balagha*.

There are far too many stylistic errors and inconsistencies in the text, and there is no space here to list them. The indexing is also quite insufficient. There is, for example, no index of Qur'anic verses. Because these flaws distract from the urgent message of the book, Curzon must be held responsible for them.

However, the book's value is impossible to overestimate. The Qur'an is a text and more than a text. It is an active presence that is tragically under-appreciated and misunderstood in this post-modern world. And whatever else the Qur'an may be, it is also a classic of world literature: unique and compelling in voice, music, and logic; read and venerated by a simultaneously hopeful, helpless, and devout humanity. Issa Boullata has done a real service to scholarship and beyond by collecting and publishing these testimonials to this plangent truth.

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CHRISTOPHER BUCK, *Paradise and Paradigm: Key Symbols in Persian Christianity and the Bahā'ī Faith* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). Pp. 419. \$81.50 cloth; \$27.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY KATHLEEN E. MCVEY, Department of History, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton, N.J.

This monograph is a revised version of a doctoral dissertation completed at the Centre for the Study of Religion at the University of Toronto in 1996. At the beginning, the author enunciates clearly his purpose, method, and organization, and he adheres closely to the agenda he has set.

His purpose is to provide a sophisticated comparison of early Syriac Christianity with the Baha'i faith as enunciated by its founder Bahau'llah. His method rests primarily on adaptations of concepts developed for cultural anthropology by Sherry Ortner and for comparative religion by Ninian Smart. Briefly characterized, his approach is a comparison of central symbols drawn from the two religious traditions as represented by a normative set of texts. While eschewing a strictly historical method, Buck strives to avoid the pitfalls of older comparative studies by attending to the distinctive historical contexts of the 4th-century Syriac Christian authors Ephrem and Aphrahat and the 19th-century articulation of the faith of Bahau'llah.

Thus, the chapters unfold systematically. Chapter 1, "Comparing Paradises," states the rationale and methodology; chapter 2, "A Historical Profile of Syriac Christianity," sets early Syriac Christianity in context, defends the choice of Ephrem and Aphrahat for the textual base, and addresses the question of characterizing the Church of the East as "Persian"; chapter 3, "A Symbolic Profile of Syriac Christianity," lays out "key scenarios" and "root metaphors" (from Ortner) according to a six-category system (Doctrinal, Ritual, Ethical, Experiential, Mythic, and Social) adapted from Smart; chapter 4, "A Historical Profile of the Baha'i Faith," situates Bahau'llah historically and proposes the view that his teaching is a "response to modernity"; chapter 5, "A Symbolic Profile of the Baha'i Faith," sets forth the "key scenarios" and "root metaphors" of Baha'i according to the six categories; and chapter 6, "Paradise Similarities and Paradigm Differences," a systematic comparison of the results of chapters 3 and 5, leads to the conclusion that the two traditions share many common metaphors and exhibit "substantive commonalities in the Doctrinal, Ethical, Experiential and Social dimensions . . . while in the Ritual and Mythic dimensions are seen the greatest divergences" (p. 257). The differences are rooted in their distinctive paradigms, Syriac Christian symbolism being "predominantly sacramental" while "Baha'i symbolism is unitive." Buck's conclusions in these chapters are schematically presented in the table based on his tables on pages 96 and 185 and his further discussion in chapter 6.

	Syriac Christianity in Ephrem's Poetry Paradigm: Sacramental Purification		Baha'i Faith in Bahau'llah's Writings Paradigm: Concentric Unity	
Ortner → Smart ↓ Dimension	Key Scenario (Strategy for Action)	Root Metaphor (for Conceptual Orientation)	Key Scenario (Strategy for Action)	Root Metaphor (for Conceptual Orientation)
Doctrinal	The Way	Physician	The Promised One	Physician
Ritual	The Robe of Glory	Medicine of Life	The Covenant	Wine/Water of Life
Ethical	Sons/Daughters of Covenant	The Mirror	Illumination	Mirrors/Gems
Experiential	The Wedding Banquet	The Pearl	Lover and Beloved	Journey/Path
Mythic	The Harrowing of Hell	Tree of Life	The Maid of Heaven	Lote-Tree/Sinai
Social	Noah's Ark/Mariner	Paradise	Crimson Ark/Holy Mariner	Paradise

In chapter 7, "Paradise and Paradigm," the conclusions and insights of the preceding chapters are brought to bear on a comparison of the Paradisal visions of the two traditions. This is, so to speak, a case study that illustrates the overlapping symbols and contrasting paradigms delineated in the previous chapter. Chapter 8, "Conclusions," is more a restatement, assessment, and defense of the author's methodological decisions than, strictly speaking, a summary statement of the book's argument and its results. As such, it is a useful reminder of Buck's assertion that his hoped for contribution in this work is "primarily methodological" (p. 9).

Thus, we are led to questions of method and contribution. According to William E. Paden, approvingly quoted by Buck, the “new comparativism” should comprise “the integration of a complex notion of pattern and system with an equally complex notion of history” (p. 30). Certainly a complex notion of pattern and system is at work here, but does the complexity yield meaningful results? In Ortner’s typology, while “root metaphors” provide conceptual orientation to a culture, “key scenarios” provide strategies for action. Although the action is broadly defined and may include performance of a ritual, the fundamental distinction between Ortner’s two modes of “elaborating key symbols” lies in differentiating between cognition and action. This distinction is not clearly delineated in Buck’s discussion of the “key symbols” within Syriac Christianity, where the link between “key scenario” and action is explicitly mentioned only once (p. 107). Otherwise the “key scenarios” are vaguely related to the sacraments of baptism and eucharist, ethical behavior, and sexual holiness. The discussion of Baha’i “key scenarios” as “strategies of action” is more explicit (pp. 185, 188, 191, 193, 199, 200). An adaptation of Ortner’s approach would be better suited to a comprehensive social analysis that includes legal and liturgical sources rather than a study based entirely on texts from a single author. Further, it is not evident that Smart’s dimensions of religion can be inter-related meaningfully with Ortner’s typology. Buck has not explained or defended this decision. Finally, his choice of particular symbols for a given place in his scheme is not entirely convincing. Ephrem’s hymns have been much studied for their symbolism; it is questionable whether this typology has brought a new clarity to earlier work by specialists in the field (especially Beck, Murray, Brock, and Bou Mansour). I am not sufficiently familiar with Baha’i studies to evaluate his work in that respect.

Turning to the second component of the criterion enunciated by Paden, “the integration of a complex notion of pattern and system with an equally complex notion of history,” we must ask, how sophisticated is Buck’s historiographic method? Although chapter 2 is a competent overview of early Syriac Christian history, it does not attend to fundamental controversies among scholars in the field. For example, the role of Greek culture, both Christian and non-Christian, in shaping early Syriac Christianity in general and Ephrem’s poetry in particular has been debated. Buck alludes to an important article by Koonammakkal (p. 34) but does not discuss or incorporate the issues it entails. Without such a discussion his characterization of Ephrem as a representative of “Persian Christianity” is problematic. Generally he hints at historical connections between the two bodies of literature at the heart of his study but backs away from claiming to have shown them (e.g., pp. 7, 9, 32, 321–23). In conclusion, this is a suggestive study that juxtaposes two disparate and equally appealing bodies of religious symbolism. It opens new possibilities for comparison and suggests new methodological approaches, but does not quite succeed as a rigorous scholarly endeavor.

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ALBRECHT FUESS, *Verbannes Ufer: Auswirkungen mamlukischer Seepolitik auf Beirut und die syro-palästinensische Küste (1250–1517)*, *Islamic History and Civilization, Studies and Texts*, vol. 39 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001). Pp. 530. \$172.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY ANDREW C. HESS, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass.

Albrecht Fuess has written a detailed history of the Syro-Palestinian frontier during the Mamluk era in order to discover why this Turko-Muslim state, which occupied such an important geographical position astride Asian-to-Mediterranean trade routes, did not develop a naval force. Because this issue arises during a period that oceanic voyages of Europeans and the Indian

Ocean expeditions of the Chinese marked the beginning of a new era in maritime history, his research will have wide appeal among historians.

For Middle Eastern history, new scholarship has exposed the limitations of the standing explanation for why Mamluk rulers had preference for warfare on horseback rather than in galleys. Although David Ayalon's emphasis on the power of equestrian culture among the Mamluks and on the relative shortage of shipbuilding materials in their territories as reasons for the regime's reluctant use of naval power is still influential, other scholars have made the argument for the technological conservatism of the Mamluks more complex. In this work, the author's empirical study of the Syro-Palestinian naval frontier provides new insight into connections among history, technology, culture, and commerce during the two centuries after the Crusades.

Chapter 1 is a study of the Mamluks' naval policy for their eastern Mediterranean border. Despite the political, commercial, and cultural importance of the populated regions of that coastline, Fuess's research demonstrates that Mamluk rulers did not defend this region with a regular naval force; they did not construct a coastal defense system; they failed to exploit the naval experience of the local populations; they displayed little interest in both European and Mediterranean naval innovations; and they let corsairs raid the coastline with relative impunity. In short, the Mamluk naval policy for the Syro-Palestinian border produced a coastal no-man's land separating interior land defenses of the regime from whatever footholds their opponents established on a devastated shoreline. As rival armies expended time and resources establishing bases of operation, Mamluk cavalry units reinforced local defenders and then drew the invading armies into combat under conditions that favored Eurasian warfare on horseback. But the negative consequence of this policy for coastal populations was substantial, as chapters 2–5 indicate.

Mamluk rulers also understood how potential rivals could take advantage of this defensive strategy. As Fuess's research on the use of diplomacy indicates, Mamluk ambassadors backed up a land-based strategy with a foreign policy aimed at playing on the divisions separating the states of the northern Mediterranean world. Of particular interest to the Mamluk emirs were alliances with regimes that had major interests in Mediterranean commerce, such as the kingdom of Aragon and Venice. But the Mamluks found they could not count on these allies to assist them in fully securing their eastern Mediterranean coastline. Therefore, the various actions of the papacy, the Knights of St. John, and the corsairs reinforced the destitution of the coastline, as the travel literature for this region indicates.

Despite this weak defense of an important frontier, the historical evidence is that, until the late 15th century, Mamluk control of Syria and Palestine remained unchallenged. Thus, the divisive politics of Europe and the non-emergence of a serious Muslim rival should be added to those factors encouraging Mamluk military conservatism.

However, at the turn of the 16th century, the character of this border changed dramatically. Ottoman rulers integrated into their military establishment the new weapons of the gunpowder era while creating a Mediterranean naval force capable of competing with Christian navies. Then the Portuguese revolutionized the scale and scope of Mamluk naval problems when they appeared in the Indian Ocean in 1498 armed with cannon-loaded, year-round sailing ships that were fully capable of defeating in open seas naval forces employing Mediterranean techniques.

At this point, Ottoman and Mamluk officials must have examined the strengths and weaknesses of each other's regimes. But even though imperial advisers knew about the new military inventions, internal arguments over high politics and military technology at the turn of the 16th century are not part of this study. Ottoman sources are not investigated in detail, and Italian sources are explored mainly in an analysis of Mediterranean commerce. Therefore, we do not learn who the protagonists were in high-stakes disputes over foreign policy at the eleventh hour of Mamluk existence or, more important, whether the state lacked the ability to centralize resources to compete in the high age of early modern gunpowder and seaborne empires.

This study provides a new definition for the Syro-Palestinian frontier in the age of the Mam-

luks. It demonstrates the relationship between the dynamics of Mediterranean politics and the stability of Mamluk border politics, and at a deeper level of analysis, it introduces the reader to the complex history of politics, culture, commerce, and technology for the changes that will sweep over and redefine this famous frontier at the turn of the 16th century.

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WILLEM FLOOR, *Safavid Government Institutions* (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda Publishers, 2001). Pp. 321. \$29.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY CHARLES MELVILLE, Faculty of Oriental Studies, Pembroke College, Cambridge

Research on the Safavid period has come a long way in the past ten years with the publication of several studies, conference proceedings, and printed editions of primary sources, including historical texts. Willem Floor has been at the forefront of this activity, with a number of monographs most notably on economic history. His new work, *Safavid Government Institutions*, is a detailed examination of the principal offices of the Safavid state, including the organization of central and provincial government and of the army. The book evolved out of a commentary on the administrative manual, Mirza Rafi'i's *Dastur al-muluk*, begun toward the end of the reign of Shah Sultan Husain (1694–1722). It is unfortunate that Floor has been unable to take advantage of the new and more complete text recently published by Iraj Afshar (*Daftar-i Tarikh*, vol. 1 [Tehran, 2001], 475–651). The newly discovered portion, for instance, contains details of the (minor) offices of *daftardār* and *'azab-bāshīr* (pp. 618–19), discussed briefly by Floor (p. 59). Other elements of Safavid state organization, such as the judiciary and the religious establishment, are excluded but already largely dealt with in other studies by the same author (*ZDMG* 150 [2000]: 461–500; *Studia Iranica* 29 [2000]: 9–60). The material in the *Dastur al-muluk* (and, for that matter, in the comparable *Tazkirat al-muluk*) is entirely rearranged in a way that helpfully regroups most of the relevant offices according to their primary function in the administration or the army. The author pays fitting tribute to the pioneering work of earlier scholars, such as Röhrborn, Savory, and Aubin (whose work is oddly described as “less accessible”; p. x) but justly remarks that a great deal of new source material has become available since then.

Indeed, one of the most impressive aspects of this book is the level of documentation presented and the enormous effort of collation that has been made. One of the most useful and enduring aspects of the work will be the numerous tables of office-holders of the main posts, including *vakīls* (i.e., the “military” *vakīl*; see pp. 10–11. It could have been made clearer that the “administrative” *vakīls* are to be found listed among the grand viziers [pp. 34–35]); *mustawfīs*; *munshīs*; *qurchī-bāshīs*; *qullār-āqāsīs* and others. In some cases, there are some important gaps, even for the well-documented reign of Shah 'Abbas—for example, in Tables 1.4 to 1.6 (concerning different ranks of *mustawfīs*), Table 1.7 (*munshīs al-mamālik*), and Table 1.8 (*majlis-nivīs*). I have no doubt that it will prove possible to fill most of these gaps from a close study of the recently discovered third volume of Fazli Beg Khuzani's *Afdal al-tawarikh*, which contains an enormous amount of detail about administrative appointments that is not found elsewhere (see, for now, *Iranian Studies* 31 [1998]: 263–65). Apart from the text itself, Fazli Beg's appendixes at the end of the volume (ff. 566v onward) contain listings of the viziers and other functionaries (*'ummal*) in the provinces and the khans and sultans and military forces (*'asākīr*) of the state, which among other things provide a basis for assessing the size of the army at the end of 'Abbas's reign.

One of the problems in writing about administrative history (of which there is far too little in the case of Iran) is the difficulty of defining terminology—and particularly of tracing the

continuity of posts and offices over any length of time (the different classification of offices in two sources as close as the *Dastur al-muluk* and *Tazkirat al-muluk* is itself rather disconcerting). Our instinctive desire to impose order and regularity on the system comes up against the inevitable fluidity of the offices and the change in titles and functions over even quite short periods. The case of the *Sipahsalar*, or senior army chief, discussed in the context of the central government rather than the organization of the army (pp. 17–28) is one case in point. The office is often apparently synonymous with the traditional term *amīr al-umarā*, and there is considerable doubt over the long-term role of the office and even its survival at times. Conflicting evidence from European observers in the 17th century does not help. Floor charts the evolution of the evidence rather clearly, tracing the transformation of the office from a powerful central command to a provincial post, a role reserved for major expeditions only (rather few in the late Safavid period), and finally apparently “back” to high overall command. It is certainly a confusing element in this scheme that individuals could hold more than one post (and title) at the same time, with a concomitant blurring of functions; that the use of terms is probably not always systematic or objective; and that sometimes the functions and influence of the office may be determined by its incumbent rather than rigidly prescribed (cf. pp. 41, 93). Christoph Werner has discussed this problem in the slightly later context of the Zand and early Qajar periods (in Charles Melville, ed., *Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference of Iranian Studies*, Vol. 2, *Mediaeval and Modern Persian Studies* [Wiesbaden, 1999], 317–25), and it is germane, too, to the tortuous discussion of terms such as *valī*, *hakīm* and *beglerbegi* (e.g., pp. 81–85), and *beglerbegi* and *amīr al-umarā* (esp. pp. 97–99). I do not think that the fact that the same person could be called both indicates that they were two separate offices.

The section on the army accounts for half the book and is its most valuable part, charting ground never covered in such detail before. The reader could be excused for thinking almost nothing had been written about it at all, as Floor does not refer to earlier efforts such as Lockhart’s “The Persian Army in the Safavi Period,” *Der Islam* 34 (1959): 89–98 (which is admittedly slight); Quzanlu’s *Tarikh-i Nizami-yi Iran* (Tehran, 1936); and Haneda, in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, vol. 2, 503–6. In his long and valuable discussion of the artillery (pp. 176 ff.), Floor refers only belatedly (p. 245, n. 1079) and grudgingly to the pioneering article by Rudi Matthee in the context of military tactics. Haneda (p. 504) discusses, among other things, the interesting account of the military review carried out by Tahmasp in 1530, which went on all night because of the large numbers marching past. Floor (p. 135) tabulates the data provided by his source (not entirely accurately) and notes that not all these were cavalry, because the numbers included various categories, such as sayyids, viziers, *mustawfīs*, *munshīs*, and others. He gives the impression that these were not mounted but further offers the erroneous definitions of “*bitikchīs*” as bowmen, “*Mazandaran*” as cavalry and foot, “*Turshīz*” as bowmen, and “*tabarrā’iyān*” as cavalry with equipment (?) (p. 134). This is all the more extraordinary as the only reference to a *bitikchī* is in the name of Khwaja Muzaffar Bitikchi, who arrived with 1,000 troops; *Mazandaran* refers to the chiefs (*amīrādīgān*) of that province, who arrived with 2,000 horsemen and whom Tahmasp was so pleased to see that he forgave them the horses they had been stipulated to bring as tribute. *Turshizi* is also a proper name that has nothing to do with archery, while the *tabarrā’iyān* are the celebrated public cursers who anathemized the first three caliphs (cf. Qadi Ahmad Qummi, *Khulasat al-tawarikh*, vol. 1, ed. Ihsan Ishraqi [Tehran, 1980], 202–3). We have here, then, a bizarre mixture of the valuable and the totally misleading in this account of an important and informative episode.

If space permitted, there are many other matters, great and small, that could be singled out for praise or blame in this very rich book. Among the oddities is to see Amir Mahmud ibn Khvandamir cited (perforce in two very different editions of the same work) as Ben Khvandamir, as though he were the product of a modern mixed marriage or even an associate of the current public enemy number one. A similarly minor point: I would expect to see the sword-

bearer normally called *silāhdār* rather than *salehdar* (or, at least, *salihdar*), as in the sources Floor cites (p. 147).

Floor's prodigious productivity is long recognized in the field of Safavid and Qajar history. The strengths and flaws of his large output have also already been identified: the bombardment of useful facts and much new information, sometimes not marshalled into a coherent or sustained argument and often marred by slipshod presentation. The last observation certainly holds true of the book under review. Although the author himself can be forgiven for his unidiomatic or faulty English, which is not his mother tongue, it is difficult to imagine how any self-respecting English-language publisher could allow such a text to appear in print without even the most basic editorial intervention. The Contents page alone (p. vi) contains three glaring misprints, quite apart from the frequent mismatch between the headings listed and those found in the text itself. Thereafter, misprints and infelicities abound, including the delightful use of "corpses" as the plural of (army) corps (first on p. x), the reference to the infantry as "sable fodder" (p. 183), the repeated use of the word "backside" for the reverse of documents (e.g., p. 9). Most of this could be eliminated in one rapid reading. The author cannot be absolved of all responsibility, however, when the carelessness and inconsistencies affect the matter of the text and not just its language. The terminology given for the various seals, for example, is a shambles (see pp. 65–69). Thus, the *hukm-i jahān muṭā' shud*, which is mainly transcribed correctly, is sometimes also written *hukm-i jahan-i muṭā' shud*, and this *izāfih* with the life of its own also appears incorrectly in *angushtar-i āftāb-i āthār*, and in *mīhr-i āthār*, but is missing from *mūhr-i sharaf-nafadh*, usually written correctly as *sharaf-i nafadh*. This carelessness does not command confidence, and the lack of attention to such matters is particularly unfortunate in a subject in which, in the author's own words, "the devil is in the detail" (p. ix).

There is an abundance of detail here, most of it extremely useful, and Floor is right to insist that such information is essential if one is to avoid erecting great theories on the basis of scanty or unreliable data. He has not entirely shied away from drawing conclusions from his work, for he is well aware of the changing context in which government institutions evolved, most notably in the gradual replacement of the Qizilbash by the *ghulāms*, and in the growth of the *Khāṣṣa* (household) administration at the expense of the *Mamālik* (state) organizations in the 17th century. His detailed analysis of the offices is one effective way to chart the pace and nature of these changes. There is a lot more still to be understood about these developments, and particularly about the administrative history of individual provinces, but Floor's valuable effort will greatly assist the task that lies ahead.

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ALLEN J. FRANK, *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910*, *Islamic History and Civilization, Studies and Texts*, 35 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001). Pp. 351. 110.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY R. D. McCHESNEY, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, New York University

The historiography of Muslim communities under Russian domination, whether czarist Russian or Soviet Russian, has until now been presented with a strongly modernist and nationalist focus. The social context created by Islamic belief and the institutions to which it gave rise have rarely been studied except as a foil for the promotion of nationalist, Russocentric, or "modernist" ideologies. The present work is therefore an important corrective. It is a richly detailed analysis of several distinct yet connected communities located just to the east of the Volga River. The book focuses on an agricultural region marked by two north–south river basins, about twenty to thirty miles apart, and roughly parallel to the Volga, about 100 miles to the

west. In particular, the work focuses on a group of villages along a major tributary (the Altata River) of one of the rivers, the Bol'shoi Uzen. In this area, Muslims were a distinct minority in the period covered by the study. The principal source for the study is a local history of these communities, the *Tawārīkh-i Āltī Ātā*, written in 1909 and 1910. Its authors were father and son, Muhammad Fatih and Muhammad al-Ilmini. Ilmin was a village in the township of Osinov Gai (also known as Iske Uzen) where the Altata River emptied into the Bol'shoi Uzen. Although the focus of the *Tawārīkh-i Āltī Ātā* is the township and four other villages in it, the al-Ilminis range over the whole watershed of the twin Bol'shoi and Malyi Uzen Rivers, thus including communities in three large administrative districts (*uezdy*)—Novouzensk, the Ural Cossack Horde, and the Kazakh Inner Horde—in all, an area of about 28,000 square miles located today in far western Kazakhstan.

In the introduction to the work, Frank says that, in contrast to previous studies, which have been generally dismissive of the importance of Islamic institutions in the areas under Russian control, his purpose is “to explore the material and human aspects of these institutions at the village level and . . . to ga[u]ge their significance to the Muslim communities that supported them and discover what patterns emerge” (p. 3). A second objective is to consider these institutions “within the broader imperial context, comparing [the] al-Ilmini[s'] information with other published studies to provide a clearer picture of the various aspects of Russia's Islamic institutions” (p. 4).

The first ninety-eight pages (chaps. 1–3) provide a general background. Frank begins with an excellent critical review of the literature on Muslim religious life in the Volga–Ural region and makes it abundantly clear how Russian imperialism and Soviet ideology have shaped virtually all writing on the subject, including the work of anti–Soviet and post–Soviet historians.

In chapter 2, Frank examines the region in terms of the spiritual meaning attached to it as well as in terms of the economy. Although the Altı Ata River Valley had only been recently settled by Muslims (in the late 18th century), by the time of the al-Ilminis the landscape had already taken on Islamic meanings. The name of the river, for example, meant “the six fathers,” which Muhammad-Fatih al-Ilmini ascribed to six devotees of Islam whose presence was confirmed by a no longer extant stone mosque, reputedly dismantled for the foundation of an Orthodox church.

Chapter 3, “Ethnography,” provides some population figures and describes the spread of the Muslim population with the expansion of the Russian empire. It also gives a good picture of the typical village structure, divided for administrative purposes into *och* and *mahalla*—the former, according to the author, being roughly equivalent to “street” and reflecting ethnic, extended family, or corporate divisions. The *mahalla* was the parish or congregation and was centered on a parish mosque. The two divisions frequently, if not inevitably, overlapped.

Because of the mix of cultures, languages, ethnic identities, and historical associations, and because of the continual movement of peoples in this small region, the crazy quilt of names (Cossacks, Muslim Cossacks, Kalmyks, nomad Kazakhs, Kazan Tatars, Service Tatars, Muslim Teptiars, Mishars, Bashkirs, Astrakhan Qaraqalpaqs) is not unexpected. In describing the “Kazakhs,” the author underscores this confusion of names. “Kazakhs came to the region in 1801, when the Russian authorities allowed Bükäy Khan to migrate with Kazakh nomads into Russian territory west of the Ural River. Al-Ilmini refers to Kazakhs throughout his narrative as *qirgiz*. The latter usage appears to be borrowed from the Russian term *kirgiz*, which was used in Russian sources in the 1920s to refer to the Kazakhs. While the Kazakhs' self-designation was and is *qazaq*, the Russians sought to distinguish the Kazakhs from the Cossacks (*kazaki*)” by calling them *qirgiz* (p. 90). Frank has done an admirable job keeping the reader aware of which group is being discussed, its antecedents and associations, and what it was called by others. His principal source, the al-Ilminis, *père et fils*, take a simpler approach to nomenclature; for them the people of their township are “Muslims,” outsiders are “Volga Tatars, Kazan Tatars,

Ural people, and Kazan Noghays." Non-Muslims are simply "nonbelievers" (*kuffār, kāfīrlar*) or "Russian people, German people," etc.

After this background discussion, the author turns to his main subject—the Islamic institutions of the region. These he treats under two general categories: the institutions of the Muslims of Novouzensk (chaps. 4–7) and the institutions of Kazakhs and Muslim Cossacks (chap. 8). For the former he considers the notion of "institution" under three headings—religious figures (ulema, imams, muezzins, Sufis), mosques and education, and rituals and belief.

In 1788, the Orenberg Spiritual Assembly was established, an event that had a profound and long-lasting effect on Islam, imposing an artificial hierarchy or "church" on the way Islam was practiced. (The Religious Boards of the Soviet Union were to be the direct descendants of the Orenberg Spiritual Assembly and other similar structures.) The assembly became a kind of licensing board for imams and muezzins and the court of appeals for local disputes. In some ways, the imperial Russian approach to Islam shared features with the British approach in India, allowing civil matters (marriage, divorce, inheritance) to be regulated by *shari'a* but at the same time establishing a parallel civil court system to which Muslims could, and did, take their business. Who was to be considered an *ʿālim*, who designated an imam or muezzin—these were all matters influenced, if not decided, by Russian administrative ideas of what a religion was and how it should be organized. Of particular interest in this chapter is the section on Sufis (pp. 151–57) where the dominant local figures were disciples of shaykhs in Bukhara and especially the Mujaddidis of Kabul. This suggests avenues for future research, especially the personal and business connections between those cities and the villages of the Novouzensk district and what this implies for the movement of ideas and other goods.

The long chapter on mosques (pp. 161–217) surveys the post-conquest fluctuations in Russian policies toward mosques—and thus, Islam generally—as well as details on individual mosques in the region covered by the al-Ilminis. Periods of determined conversion of Muslims to Christianity and mosque-destruction are followed by periods of tolerance and even state-supported mosque building. The latter is particularly interesting and, according to Frank, occurred as a way to support trade with Muslim regions, presumably to provide a place of worship in a Christian locality for Muslim merchants. Another reason that the Russian state would support mosque building was to provide a place of worship for Muslims serving in the military or working in factories. The discussion of mosques also offers much detail on the nitty-gritty of mosque building, how it may have been funded locally, and what means were used to support the mosque's operating costs. The author states (p. 195) that endowments (*awqāf*) were "poorly developed." But elsewhere we find land "set aside" to support a mosque but are not told how that was legally accomplished. "[T]he elders decided to lease . . . 200 desiatins of land" to support a mosque in one case, but how "elders" could decide to lease out privately owned land might have been clarified. The fact that there was no record of the land being sold afterwards certainly makes this reviewer think that in fact, if not in name, that this transaction represented a waqf endowment. Perhaps the lack of documents has made the author, who is relying on a source that may have felt no need to specify such arrangement with the term waqf, cautious about referring to what was going on as the creation of waqf endowments.

The chapter on education details the system of madrasa in the region, the standard works studied (works that were standard in the curricula of Muslim educational institutions from India to the Ottoman Empire), the financing of education, the opportunities for women, and the failure of the Jadid movement to make much headway in changing the curriculum, not because its advocates were resisted or did not have the opportunity to establish Jadidist schools but, rather, because there seemed little to be gained from a Jadidist education, and therefore demand never developed.

All in all, the work is a major contribution to understanding the role religion played for the vast majority of Muslims living out their lives in regions under the political control of a society

occasionally tolerant of, but often hostile to, their beliefs and the institutions through which those beliefs were lived.

Finally, I am reluctantly compelled to draw attention to a problem endemic to this Brill series: the absence of an editorial hand. Authors are generally not trained to do their own copy editing and should not be expected to do it. Copy editing as an indispensable part of the production of a book has been jettisoned by Brill, which now seems to be in the printing and marketing business and no longer what can be called a “publisher” in any traditional sense—at least as far as this series is concerned. Frank’s book is marred by errors that professional copy editing would have eliminated—missing words, misplaced or missing commas, lack of agreement between subject and verb, inconsistent capitalization, word repetition, the “s” missing from plural nouns, an “s” added to singular nouns, words inadvertently not deleted, missing hyphenation in compound adjectives, the demonstrative adjective without a clear antecedent, and pronouns without antecedents or with the wrong antecedent. These and other errors that typically occur in drafts would and should have been eliminated by a copy editor. The author, of course, bears some responsibility, but because only Brill is likely to enjoy a financial profit from this book, I think it must bear a far greater measure of responsibility. In reviewing an earlier work in this same series, I lamented the cavalier approach to editing that Brill clearly had adopted then. A previous editor of the series responded with assurances that Brill would take more care in the future. The present work suggests, instead, that the complaint fell on deaf ears. If Brill will not change its ways, then it behooves authors who must turn to Brill for publication to make sure their work passes through the hands of a professional copy editor before it is submitted. A work as important as Frank’s *Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia* deserved far better.

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JANICE DELEDALLE-RHODES, *L'Orient représenté: Charles Montagu Doughty et les Voyageurs anglais du XIXe Siècle* (Brussels: P. I. E.–Peter Lang, 2000). Pp. 374.

REVIEWED BY JASON THOMPSON, Department of History, American University in Cairo

In one of the great understatements about the literature of Arabian travel and exploration, T. E. Lawrence said that it is not easy to write about Charles M. Doughty. Every one of the famous travelers in Arabia—whether Burton, Palgrave, Doughty, or the Blunts in the 19th century or Bell, Lawrence, Philby, or Thesiger in the 20th—presents some complex problems, but Doughty seems to combine them all. His background, his psyche, his conduct during his voyage, his later life, and above all his masterpiece, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, are filled with enigmas and ambiguities.

Nothing in Doughty’s background portended the emergence of a great traveler, explorer, and writer unless it was the fact that he dissipated most of his inherited money early on, forcing him to travel not for luxury but for economy by going to cheap places. He was orphaned at a tender age, and a miserable childhood nearly turned him into a social misfit. A stammer dashed hopes of entering the Royal Navy, and his years at Cambridge were a disappointment, for he could not distinguish central matters from peripheral ones, prompting one of his exasperated examiners to exclaim, “If you asked him for a collar he upset his whole wardrobe at your feet.” For a time he was active in geology, an experience that is strongly evident in the textures of *Arabia Deserta*, but he soon fell under the spell of English literature. Convinced that Victorian English was hideously corrupt, he found inspiration in the works of Spenser and Chaucer. In fact, one of the attractions of Arabia was his belief that the speech of the bedouin was an Arabic counterpart to the older, purer English that he cherished. “Their utterance is short and with emphasis,” he wrote. “There is a perspicuous propriety in their speech, with quick signifi-

cance.” What was intended to be a relatively short excursion into Arabia extended to two years, 1876–78, during which he covered much more territory than any of the other major 19th-century travelers there. Yet a more unlikely Arabian traveler can scarcely be imagined. Thoroughly improvident, he expected that food and water would just appear, as they did, thanks to the hospitality of his hosts. He was subjected to beatings, insults, and threats that most would have found intolerable, but he suffered them patiently and recounted them in detail, seriously tempting the reader to add masochism to his list of mental peculiarities. Doughty compounded the difficulties by obstinately and publicly flaunting his Christianity, which at times approached fanaticism and bigotry, unlike other travelers, such as Burton, who went about in disguise or at least maintained a low profile in regard to their religious identity.

Doughty persevered, survived, and returned to Europe, where he spent nine years preparing his monumental (600,000 words) *Travels in Arabia Deserta*. Initial responses were not encouraging. Four publishers rejected it. “Most readers and all reviewers would . . . say that parts of it are not English at all,” wrote one. “The manuscript ought to be taken in hand, recast, and practically rewritten by a practised literary man.” Nor was this merely a crass opinion, for although *Arabia Deserta* is assuredly one of the great literary works of the 19th century, it can be exceedingly difficult and puzzling. Many well-intentioned readers have found it absolutely opaque. When the book was eventually published in 1888, it made only a small splash. That literary duty done, Doughty returned to his first love, English literature, and spent most of the next twenty years composing an epic poem titled *The Dawn in Britain*. This was the work he cared about the most. Published in six thick volumes, it quickly achieved a permanent, well-deserved obscurity. Even Wilfred Scawen Blunt, who greatly admired Doughty, considered his poetry “the worst” of the century. Only when Doughty prepared an abridged version of *Arabia Deserta*, published in 1908 under the title *Wanderings in Arabia*, did he realize that he had never, as he said, “washed his hands” of Arabia. At last, increasing recognition, honors, and a little much needed money came to him, although it can be persuasively argued that until the end of his days in 1926, Doughty never fully realized the nature of his success or how he had accomplished it.

With such rich biographical material available, one might reasonably expect that a study of *Arabia Deserta* would look first to Doughty’s life for its key, but Janice Deledalle-Rhodes takes a different direction. Her method in *L’Orient représenté*, as she explains in its Introduction, is “to resuscitate the context, that of nineteenth-century travel literature about the Middle East, in which its author wrote” (p. 11). To that end, she draws on a wide range of contemporary works, although some writers, such as Kinglake, Burton, Palgrave, and W. S. Blunt, are adduced much more often than others. References to them are presented within strict categories to reveal what makes Doughty’s work unique. The result can be powerful. For example, with elegant economy of words, Deledalle-Rhodes demonstrates the nature of Lady Hester Stanhope’s attraction to Lebanon; likewise, she makes the initial importance of the Arabic language to Doughty readily apparent. These and other important insights would have been significant contributions.

I use the past conditional to describe Deledalle-Rhodes’ accomplishment because her book has appeared almost two decades later than it should have. Apparently, it is—at least, to a large extent—the thesis with which she earned her Ph.D. in 1981. Its overview of the field is that of about the time that Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978) was published but before the implications of that explosive work were fully assessed—and, more important, before the appearance of many other works about Western contact with the Middle East. A survey of Deledalle-Rhodes’s bibliography finds only a half-dozen works published after the late 1970s, apart from a few of her own subsequent articles. She refers to Leila Ahmed’s 1978 study of Edward William Lane as “recent” (p. 94). Abundant resources for contextualizing Doughty now exist, as do numerous in-depth studies of the aspects of his work that she surveys, as well as others, such as gender, that she does not. Many of her hard-won conclusions now seem naive, passé, or even irrelevant.

The field has moved a vast distance since this book was composed, but the book has not moved with it.

Even had it been published much earlier, *L'Orient représenté* should have been subjected to heavy revision and additional perspective. Its several chapters are subdivided into sections that themselves are often subdivided once, even twice, more. This reveals traces of compositional scaffolding that is useful during construction but that ought to disappear on completion, leaving the finished work to stand by virtue of its internal structural elements. Deledalle-Rhodes considers her organization to be a device for analysis, but if so, the number of conclusions distilled by its cumbersome machinery is surprisingly small, and some of the conclusions sound like platitudes. "The analysis that we have done will show clearly that if Doughty actually shares certain preoccupations of his contemporaries, these are governed by a single, central motivation: that of better understanding man and his place in the universe" (pp. 67–68). One also begins to worry about the objectivity of some of those conclusions, as Deledalle-Rhodes repeatedly finds Doughty utterly unique as a traveler—indeed, in a class quite by himself. The Doughty that she presents is so perceptive that those who disagree with him are either mistaken outright or, even if apparently correct, oblivious to his deeper, more subtle insights. A more seasoned appraisal of Doughty might capture more of his essence.

Charles M. Doughty was complex. Even today his personality can occasionally drive his readers to despair, just as it sometimes annoyed his Arabian hosts almost beyond measure. Yet he wrote one of the outstanding works of travel, exploration, and personal encounter in the Middle East, as many thoughtful passages in Deledalle-Rhodes's *L'Orient représenté* demonstrate. But it is a mistake to attempt to reconcile his many contradictions and clarify his perplexing ambiguities, for they constitute the very essence of Doughty and generate the deeper meanings that make his *Travels in Arabia Deserta* endlessly fascinating to scholars of cross-cultural contact.

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REMCO ENSEL, *Saints and Servants in Southern Morocco*, Social, Economic, and Political Studies of the Middle East and Asia, vol. 67 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999). Pp. 294. \$90.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY MARGARET RAUSCH, Department of Religious Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence

The topic of master–servant and patron–client relationships is not new to the multi-disciplinary literature on Morocco. What distinguishes this work from the others are the context and approach as well as the societal positions of the two parties to this relationship. In this case, the focus is on two social categories: the marginal and subordinate *haratin* (sing. *hartani*) and the *shurfa* (sing. *sharif*), or religious elite, in an oasis in the Dra Valley in the south.

In the Introduction, the author engages with prominent theorists and scholars in subaltern studies and anthropology in positioning his approach to the marginalization and stigmatization of the *haratin*. Drawing on the psychological concept of double-bind and its reception in the sociological literature, he stresses the significance of its application for understanding the relationships and interpersonal interactions between members of the *haratin* and *shurfa*. By revealing the interconnections between this double-bind relationship and the *haratin's* occupational specialization and resulting monopolization of certain kinds of communal tasks, the author purports to illuminate the "prevalent cultural ideals of an oasis society in southern Morocco."

In the two chapters following the Introduction, the author defines pertinent terms and delineates geographically, architecturally, and sociologically the oasis community under study. Relying on anthropological studies of strategies of identity formation, historical sources on the origin of the *haratin*, and anecdotes collected during his fieldwork, the author positions the

haratin in Morocco at large and within the oasis community. He introduces another term for *haratin*—namely, *drawa* (sing. *drawī*), the Arabic *nisba* adjective for someone from the Dra Valley, as a euphemism that implies a place of origin within Morocco. The term is not, however, used for other inhabitants of this area; nor is it completely void of negative connotations. In this section, the author also identifies and traces the origins of the various groups composing the oasis community. He illustrates their positions in the community to a large extent on the basis of the inclusion of their homes in housing settlements, their exclusion from them, and their proximity to or distance from certain structures. He concludes with a description of the occupational specialties of the *drawa* and a social and occupational history of a prominent *drawa* family over several generations. Throughout both chapters and elsewhere in the book, the author focuses primarily on the *haratin* and secondarily on the *shurfa*. The resulting picture of the structure and proportions of the overall population at the time of the fieldwork remains ambiguous. Figures or percentages of population segments would fill in this gap.

In the next two chapters, the author carves out the structural and material parameters of the intricate interdependence and forms of intimate interpersonal interaction in the relations between the *drawa* and *shurfa*. He draws on his fieldwork and on studies of other regions in Morocco and beyond, comparing his sample population with other *haratin* or similar groups elsewhere. By encompassing both past and present, he demonstrates a tendency from both sides to relinquish with time certain areas of this interdependence. First, he focuses on the agricultural tasks performed by the *drawa*. Their knowledge, experience, and capacity for strenuous labor make them indispensable to the *shurfa* and the broader community. Their status as tenants of *shurfa* landowners; the exchange of services for goods and stability; and their fictive kinship established by co-lactation, or milk bonds, also bond the individuals in these two social categories. These types of interaction and bonding and the unequal socio-economic status of the two parties are characteristics of patron–client relationships. In the second of the two chapters, the author shows that the hierarchical configuration also applies in the realm of spiritual exchange. He characterizes the *shurfa* as cultural brokers and defines their tasks and roles within a thorough description of the Islamic rituals and practices prevailing in the community. He describes other tasks reserved for the *drawa*, such as the cleaning of the mosque and sanctuary and the digging of graves, stressing the closeness and interdependence between the two groups. Here again, some of the tasks, practices, and symbols are being abandoned as replacements develop within the framework of other societal transformations.

The last two chapters (excluding the Conclusion) describe the role of the *drawa* as social and cultural brokers, an attribute they share with the *shurfa*, though the details of this role differ between the two groups. The marginality of the *drawa* makes them privy to inside knowledge and access to private spheres. These aspects of their societal role situate them in a double-bind. *Adab*, or “civilized conduct,” historically grounded by the author in the Arabo-Islamic context of its origin provides guidelines for their behavior in such instances. The second of these two chapters focuses on the spiritual roles reserved for the *drawa* because of their marginality. Examining the anthropological literature on Morocco and beyond, the author discusses the widely observed tendency for the marginalized to acquire specialized knowledge and perform rituals related to pollution, fertility, and the realm of the supernatural. After providing background on this domain of beliefs and rituals for the Islamic and Moroccan setting, the author specifies tasks within it carried out exclusively by the *drawa* as a result of their societal status, including healing practices.

Throughout the book, one is struck by its strong hierarchical vision of the *shurfa*, or religious elite, and the marginal and subordinate *haratin* or *drawa*, despite the instances of proximity and even intimacy that are also emphasized. Further, both are spiritual and cultural brokers equally indispensable to each other and to the flow of daily life in the oasis community. The boundaries of both categories, the author contends, are dissolving over time, though the older

generation still clings to the stability and security provided by the traditional structures and practices. One *sharif* carries a photocopy of his genealogy tracing his origin back to the family of the Prophet Muhammad. Members of the younger generations have left for the large urban centers of the north or have migrated to France in hopes of breaking out of the old mold on a number of levels. Some have picked up on Islamist ideas and question various practices from yet another point of view when they return to the community for visits. The author enhances his descriptions of interactions, behavior, and structures by incorporating informants' comments and anecdotes from his fieldwork. The effective combination of theoretical analyses, descriptions and comparisons among settings and time periods, and anecdotes and informants' contributions engages the reader on a variety of levels.

Structurally, the book is sound, easily accessible, and equipped with useful tools. It includes a glossary of the important Arabic terms, a bibliography, an index, and photographs of the oasis and members of its community at significant moments. Stylistically, it is stimulating and enjoyable to read, in spite of abundant minor linguistic errors—in particular, incorrect prepositions.

In all, this book constitutes a well-founded analysis and a very informative and significant contribution to the ethnographic and anthropological literature on Morocco and to similar societal configurations elsewhere. It speaks to both students and scholars within and outside the field.

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KARIN VAN NIEUWKERK, *A Trade Like Any Other: Female Singers and Dancers in Egypt* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995). Pp. 237. \$35.00 cloth; \$11.98 paper.

REVIEWED BY MARGARET RAUSCH, Department of Religious Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence

A Trade Like Any Other explores the status of freelance women singers and dancers in Egypt. In her Introduction, Nieuwkerk states the twofold goal of her book: to de-exoticize the entertainment trade and to generate more sympathy for male and female entertainers among Egyptians and Westerners alike.

She proceeds with a brief examination of the literature on infamous occupations in the Middle Ages in both the European and Muslim contexts, extracting from a variety of sources the pertinent aspects generally found to characterize them: strained relations with worldly and religious authorities, weak legal status, physical segregation, exchange of honor for money, and hypocrisy. She concludes the section by quoting Blok's (1985) general theory that the practitioners of these occupations are ambiguous, liminal, and betwixt and between; involved with margins, thresholds, and boundaries; and serve to bridge the differences between clear-cut categories such as self and not-self, city and countryside, man and animal, culture and nature, civilized and primitive—dichotomies, some of which Nieuwkerk then questions. Next she addresses the need to “carefully contextualize” the status of Egyptian entertainers by broaching an important element of the Egyptian context: Islamic views on music, singing, and dancing. This vast topic is covered in a three-page synopsis of the debate on the topic of the acceptability of the reception of musical performance in the Muslim contexts that includes the perspectives of the 11th- and 17th-century religious scholars al-Ghazali and Chelebi and contemporary religious authorities in Cairo, Shaltut, al-Qaradawi, and al-Sha'rawi whose views vary widely. All of them specify that acceptability depends on the genre of music, the type of performer, the atmosphere, the context, and the audience. Due to its brevity, few of the points raised, which include the statement *sawt al-mar'a 'awra*, gazing at beardless youths, and ecstasy derived from dancing—the latter two of which probably refer to Sufi ceremonies—can be adequately handled.

Like the scholars whose views she consults, Nieuwkerk concludes the section emphasizing that context and genre influence the acceptability of the performance, and thus the performer's status. She defines three main contexts of contemporary Egyptian musical performance as "first, weddings and saint's day celebrations, second, the nightclub circuit, and, finally, the performing arts circuit, the performances in concert halls and theaters, on radio and television, etc." The Introduction ends with a description of her fieldwork experience.

Relying primarily on European travel literature, chapters 2 and 3 provide a description of private and public musical performance; the transformation of the various musical-performance professions, in particular that of the *'alma* (pl. *'awālim*); and the flux in the relationship between the state and this occupation (the primary goal of the two chapters as stated in the Introduction). The description includes performances within and outside Cairo from the beginning of the 19th century until the late 1980s (when her fieldwork was carried out), as well as some details of cultural exchange with the West in this area. This historical exposé begins with a critique of the early travelers' "Orientalist" view of female entertainers and ends with the assertion that, for most Egyptians, it is economic means rather than the influence of the growing Islamism of the 1980s that affect their decision as to whether to hire freelance female entertainers at their family celebrations.

Chapter 4 contains seven short biographical sketches narrated by the female performers themselves. These accounts provide fascinating insight into the trials and tribulations of the women's chosen path and way of life. This information is supplemented by anecdotes that emerge in subsequent, more theoretically oriented chapters. In chapter 5, Nieuwkerk explores the question of the societal marginalization and stigmatization of these entertainers. Her analysis is based on their use of an occupationally based secret language, which she derives from earlier studies and her own observations. It also incorporates the responses of Egyptians from a wide variety of milieus and compares the entertainers' lifestyles and personality traits with those of the stereotypical "real Egyptian" or *ibn il-balad*. As the profession is deemed immoral and shameful by some of her informants, she devotes chapter 6 to the long-debated honor and shame "syndrome" and its applicability to entertainers' lives and work. Here she elaborates a code of honor that includes rules of professional behavior specific to entertainers. As this code varies according to gender, chapter 7 is dedicated to a theoretical analysis of sex and gender in the Muslim context that draws on a vast array of historically and geographically diverse sources. Nieuwkerk concludes that there is an accepted co-existence of weak and strong men and women, which she then applies to elements of the entertainment context. In Chapter 8, she illustrates the delicate balance between these parallel images of weak and strong women maintained by the female entertainers in their self-presentations in their personal and professional lives, returning to the stereotypical "real Egyptian," this time the feminine form, or *bint il-balad*. In her final chapter, Nieuwkerk explains that entertainment is a dishonorable profession for women, but not for men, and acknowledges the need for further research on the social and cultural construction of gender and the body.

Structurally, the book is easily accessible and follows a logical progression, though the breadth of the range of theoretical issues addressed sometimes force the author to provide only a somewhat disjointed selection of examples from the literature on each. After the Introduction and the two-chapter historical background, each chapter ends with a question to be explored in the subsequent chapter. The book is equipped with useful tools: a list of photographs, a note on transcription, an appendix explaining the fieldwork methodology, a glossary of the important Arabic terms, a bibliography, and an index. It contains photographs of the female dancers and singers during their performances and in their daily lives throughout. Methodologically, it strives to let the voices of the performers and their Egyptian audiences be heard. Stylistically, it is coherent and stimulating.

In general, this book constitutes a very informative study of female singers and dancers in

Egypt, their lives and their work as freelance entertainers, and an innovative analysis of their societal status. It makes a significant contribution to the ethnographic and anthropological literature on one area of women's musical performance in Egypt and elsewhere. It will benefit both students and scholars within and outside the field.

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R. HRRAIR DEKMEJIAN AND HOVANN SIMONIAN, *Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001). Pp. 271. \$65.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY SHIREEN HUNTER, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has had far-reaching consequences for the character of the international political system, the full impact of which has not yet become totally clear. The systemic changes triggered by the Soviet Union's collapse have been felt globally, but the region that once formed part of the union and its immediate and near neighbors have felt their effect most strongly.

This has been especially true for the countries located in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia. These countries, which emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, vary widely in many respects, including their endowment in natural resources, their ethnic and religious composition, and their external orientation. What they do have in common is a wide range of challenges, mostly related to what is generally called nation-building, including finding a new philosophical framework and value systems to guide their internal development and the pattern of their external relations.

The other major and common challenge that these countries have faced has been how to cope with increased regional and international attention and efforts to shape their future. A particular aspect of the post-Soviet international system and the network of interlocking relations that has developed in the past decade is the prominent role played by two bodies of water, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, as the nexus of regional and international cooperation and conflict.

The Caspian Sea, in particular, has become the focus of attention and competition, and the countries bordering on it have come to be seen as forming a special, self-contained geo-political and economic zone—hence, the constant references to Caspian Basin, Caspian Zone, and even Caspian studies.

To be sure, the Caspian Sea as a closed sea—or even large lake—with a fragile ecosystem and substantial energy resources, and bordering on key international and regional actors, such as the Russian Federation and Iran—has special needs and problems that require particular attention and study. However, the Caspian Basin—indeed, region—is not a self-contained zone economically, politically, or culturally. Rather, in all three respects, the Caspian region is intimately linked to central and southern Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Turkey. Indeed, at least from a geo-political perspective, the importance of the Caspian region to a great extent lies in its proximity to these more important regions. Moreover, because the Caspian region is the depository of considerable energy resources, its politics and economics are inextricably linked to global energy politics.

Thus, to understand and assess various dynamics that have been shaping the internal developments and external relations of the Caspian littoral states in the past decade, both the international context and various global economic and political factors should be taken into account.

Troubled Waters by R. Hrrair Dekmejian and Hovann Simonian embarks on such an ambitious task, and to a great extent it succeeds. It provides concise analysis of the Caspian region's legal, environmental, and energy-related dynamics. It analyzes the internal evolution and external

relations of the Caspian littoral states, and it lays out clearly the intricate web of interaction among a wide range of state and non-state actors with the region.

The book is well researched, well written, and full of useful information. It is a valuable introduction to the politics and economics of the Caspian region at various levels. Its extensive bibliography provides the reader with useful sources for further and more detailed information regarding various aspects of the Caspian Sea, its riparian states, and regional and international factors affecting its development.

In short, although the notion of the Caspian Sea—or any other sea—as an organizing principle for the analysis of such intricate issues as global energy and competition for control of these resources, the routes of their transportation, and the direction of external policies of a diverse group of countries is of questionable validity, the authors of *Troubled Waters* do an excellent job of weaving these diverse themes together.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743803300212

ALAWI D. KAYAL, *The Control of Oil: East–West Rivalry in the Persian Gulf* (London: Kegan Paul, 2002). Pp. 250. \$127.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY HASSAN SHAYGANNIK, Department of Economics, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton

This book is well researched in both content and form. The author's methodological approach to the subject at hand is both robust and lucid. The major drawback of the book, however, is that it is old. The book is based on the author's doctoral dissertation completed some thirty years ago and, alas, does not address any of the issues that have emerged since 1972. The focal point of this book is to maintain that the politics of oil should not be looked on in isolation from policies pursued by Western governments—in particular, the United States.

Chapter 1 presents a clear picture of the international supply and demand for oil. The author puts forward useful data on the rising consumption of oil within the industrial world and singles out Japan for a special focus. Chapter 2 explores the strategic significance of oil, especially in the Persian Gulf. Kayal shows how the bulk of the industrial economy in the Persian Gulf has been fired up by the oil trade, which in turn functions as a source of state power (p. 25). He maintains that, despite technological advances and discoveries of new sources of energy, the vital importance of oil has not diminished. After all, not only is oil still the main source of energy, but thousands of its derivatives are equally important to the industrial world. Yet despite the ever-increasing need for oil and its derivatives, oil-producing states have not managed to seal the gap between the rich and the poor because of the uneven system of wealth distribution (p. 31). As the only remaining superpower—economically and militarily—the United States has a vital interest in the stability of this region. Oddly enough, however, America's unequivocal support for Israel—as demonstrated in vetoing numerous United Nations resolutions condemning Israel—has contributed its share to creating severe resentment toward those oil-producing states allied with the United States. The result, according to the author, is that oil-producing Arab countries have gotten the short end of the stick because they are deeply dependent on oil rent, political aid, and security patronage provided by the West. Ironically, the author refrains from delving deeply into Arab–American relations, and even when he does, he adopts a rather tongue-in-cheek style.

Chapter 3 provides a historical perspective on the struggle for control of oil by covering the colonial conflicts of the British, the Dutch, the Portuguese, and others with subjugated people in Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Later, the conflicts involving the British, the Russians, and the Soviets are recounted. Chapter 4, “The Iranian Crisis,” provides a salient example of the intense power struggle that was in force. This valuable chapter, which is based

on solid data and sources, demonstrates how the British manipulated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Kayal writes: "in [the] 1950s only 15% of one-hundred million pounds net profit was paid to Iran" (p. 99).

This chapter in particular is indicative of the fact that the strength of *The Politics of Oil* relies on its empirical data and historical descriptions rather than on any theoretical or analytical model, to which the author is clearly averse. The case of the Iranian crisis, for example, could have been better analyzed by the New Institutional framework considering the internal structures of the oil-producing states. Alternatively, the "dependency theory" or "world system" model could have shed light on the nature of the core-periphery relations and the global division of labor imposed by such a configuration.

In Chapter 5, Kayal provides vivid examples of how the British policy of divide and rule led to the segmentation of the territory around the Persian Gulf (p. 124). In the second part of this chapter, titled "The Surplus Capacity," the author marshals a host of facts and figures related to the activities of such companies as Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of California, Texas Oil Company, Mobil, and Shell. Another interesting chapter in the book (chap. 6) deals with Soviet motives for Middle East involvement. Kayal maintains that the Soviet Union's military was present in the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal for perhaps all the same geo-political reasons as the British (p. 147). In retrospect, one can speculate how the adamant Western desire to keep the Soviets at bay, by limiting their access to the vital resources of these regions, precipitated the eventual downfall of the USSR.

Chapter 7 provides a useful account of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries by elaborating on its global significance, internal structure, management strategies, and supply and pricing mechanisms. Here again, empirically and historically, a cohesive picture of this organization is presented that attests to the hard bargaining style representative of core-periphery relations (p. 187). Kayal ends this chapter with an interesting remark. "One looks at these developments and observes that while rivalry among superpowers is dominating the scene, there forges ahead a cluster of oil-producing and oil-consuming power centers bent on grasping the control for themselves" (p. 196).

The book ends with the conclusion that the oil in the Persian Gulf is a factor in the exercise of world leadership (p. 203). A quarter-century after it was originally written, this conclusion still rings true for the United States, whereas there is no longer any Soviet Union to speak of. Overall, this reviewer believes that, even though it does not cover the monumental events of 1973-74 and 1979-80, this book has a historical value that has not been overshadowed by the passing of time.

DOI: 10.1017.S0020743803310219

SHAUL MISHAL AND AVRAHAM SELA, *The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). Pp. 246. \$49.50 cloth; \$17.50 paper.

REVIEWED BY QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, Department of International Studies, Rhodes College, Memphis, Tenn.

Popular perceptions frequently characterize militant Islamic groups such as Hamas as uncompromising, ideological movements trapped by rigid adherence to dogma. Such understandings view radical groups as irrationally beholden to strict religious doctrine, engendering fatalistic assessments of the possibility for peaceful political change. Against this general perspective, Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela offer a more nuanced view of Hamas (and implicitly of Islamist movements in general) as a strategic actor constrained by the realities of political context rather than doctrine. In a manner akin to rational-choice theory (though not explicitly recognized as such), they detail the strategic decisions of Hamas as it balances ideological and pragmatic imperatives to ensure the survival of the movement in a dynamic environment.

The central argument of the book is that decisions and actions by Hamas must be understood as strategies for adapting to a changing political context without relinquishing formal movement doctrine. Although the movement's long-term goal is to replace Israel with a Palestinian Islamic state, its immediate concern is to survive and enhance its public presence and support in Palestinian society. Without this presence, the movement will be marginalized (perhaps even eliminated) and thus unable to engage any cause. In pursuing its goals, however, the movement faces a formidable obstacle: how to address political realities without surrendering some of its ideological constancies. Dogmatic rigidity would enhance solidarity and support among its following and solidify its unique identity vis-à-vis Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Palestinian Authority, but the actions such adherence promotes are likely to engender harsh Israeli responses. These responses in turn could undermine the support of bystander publics that seek an end to the economic and social hardships of occupation, thus eroding the movement's base in society. However, any move to appease societal tendencies toward peace could create centrifugal pressures within Hamas and factionalize the movement.

Mishal and Sela attempt to explain how the movement reconciled these tensions. The book contends that Hamas addressed such issues primarily through creative doctrinal flexibility that provided normative justifications, rooted in Hamas ideology, for necessary compromises informed by the realities of political context. For example, understanding its own military and political weakness vis-à-vis the PLO, Hamas advocated peaceful co-existence between the two movements. Any violent intra-Palestinian confrontation would have favored Arafat's groups and at best produced a bloody stalemate, thus undermining the entire nationalist movement and the prospect of successfully confronting Israel. Similarly, any unrestrained violence against Israel is likely to have engendered proportional responses that favored the Israelis. Israeli counteroffensives or retributive actions also would have led to increased economic hardships and a potential Palestinian backlash against Hamas. As a result, Hamas advocated a policy of controlled violence, frequently unleashed in response to Israeli actions that called for Palestinian vengeance. Even acceptance of peace with Israel was possible because it would allow the Palestinian nationalist movement to build its forces for a future assault. Such strategic decisions were justified in terms of Islamic concepts such as *ṣabr* (patience) and *hudna* (truce), which legitimize a pause in jihad as a stage before a successful renewal of hostilities that will reward the true believers. The book provides detailed explanations of such examples, drawn from newspapers, secondary sources, and Hamas documents, to demonstrate the pragmatic nature of the movement and its ability to refine doctrine to support politically expedient tactics, such as reticent acceptance of a possible peace treaty with Israel, informal support of candidates in Palestinian Authority elections, and limitations to violence.

The merits of the book are numerous. First, and most prominently, it provides a fresh framework for understanding Islamic activism and moves beyond traditional approaches that focus on the ideological underpinnings of radical groups without fully elucidating the complex relationship between ideational factors and behavior. In collective action, ideas are framed and used by activists for mobilization, and the authors convincingly demonstrate how Hamas reframed doctrine to support pragmatic political considerations that enhanced the movement's survival in a changing political environment. Second, the book uses a rich array of internal Hamas documents that explicitly depict the rational, strategic considerations among activists (as outlined, for example, in a Hamas publication reproduced in Chapter 3 that provides a table detailing the advantages and disadvantages of participation and nonparticipation in Palestinian Authority elections). Many of these sources provide a written record of Hamas policies and decisions and demonstrate the evolution of doctrinal justifications as the political context shifted. And third, the authors consistently compare Hamas with other Islamic groups in the Middle East to provide a deeper comparative dimension that is embedded in the analysis throughout the book, thereby enhancing the generalizability of the findings. It is an excellent

study and certainly deserves attention among students of Islamic movements and Palestinian politics.

Although the book is a substantive addition to Middle East studies, there are a few minor limitations. Methodologically, the authors rely exclusively on textual sources (at least, cited sources), and while their assortment of primary Hamas documents is commendable, an ethnographic touch seems necessary if one seeks comprehensively to explicate the relationships among ideas, behavior, and strategy. As researchers in the region fully understand, action and behavior frequently diverge from the written word—whether internal movement documents or newspaper reports—and some triangulation through interviews or other ethnographic methods would have strengthened some of the evidence. Having said this, there are understandably many limitations to research on Hamas, especially for Israeli scholars, and this quibble may reflect an unrealistic optimism about access.

The comparative analysis throughout the book could also have used some improvements. There is a tendency only to use supportive, analogous comparative cases while downplaying other tendencies in Islamic movements. For example, while the authors assert that most Islamic groups target the national context (as Hamas does) and many have moved in pragmatic directions away from violence (Islamist factions in Algeria and the Islamic Group in Egypt, for example), a new trend toward international linkages and targets of violence has emerged since the 1990s that is overlooked in the comparisons. The book's framework could easily have accommodated a broader range of Islamic movements by interpreting the shift to the international arena as a strategic response to blocked domestic opportunities, but it does not address such issues. Admittedly, the comparisons are tangential to the overall argument of the book, but the tendency to compare similar cases rather than address a wider range of movements weakens a few points raised in the comparative analysis.

Finally, the authors seem to have missed an opportunity to broaden the findings to non-Islamic movements, as well. The use of an implicit rational-choice perspective certainly lends itself to comparisons with other studies of social movements, rebellions, and terrorism and could have been used to create a dialogue with a broader audience outside the Middle East.

That said, the book is intended as an analysis of Hamas, not as a general treatment of Islamic activism or collective action. As a result, the minor shortcomings of the comparative dimensions do not detract from the overall objectives and contribution of the book. It is well written, conscientiously documented, and theoretically rich. It is solid work and highly recommended.

DOI: 10.1017.S0020743803320215

SIMON W. MURDEN, *Islam, the Middle East, and the New Global Hegemony* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002). Pp. 235. \$19.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY ALI R. ABOOTALEBI, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire

Simon Murden has written a timely book mainly to describe and highlight the position of Islam and the Middle East in the overall global environment, characterized by Western—and particularly, American—hegemony. The book is valuable to undergraduate students, but it can also be a quick refresher on the topic for some graduate students. The book does not attempt to provide new theories in explaining the inferior position of the Middle East in the global system; nor does it claim to be an in-depth analysis of the reasons behind a global system dominated by the West. Murden focuses on the challenge posed to Islam by Westernization and how Islam and the Middle East have responded and adapted to this challenge: it describes the advent and evolution of modern globalized politics and economics and how Muslim societies in the Middle East are responding and adapting to it. The book is divided into an Introduc-

tion and two main parts, with a total of seven chapters. Part 1 deals with Islam and global hegemony, and Part 2 discusses Muslim resistance and adaptation in the liberal international order.

The book attempts to take the reader beyond the well-known dichotomous approaches advocated by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington on the nature of the present state of the global system. Murden finds these grand theories inadequate and believes the actual global economic and political environment is simply more complex. In addition to criticizing Fukuyama's and Huntington's theses on "the end of history" and "the clash of civilizations" on theoretical grounds, he finds them misleading. The clash thesis in particular portrays a monolithic view of the Islamic world, dismissing the diversity in various Muslim communities and their political leaderships.

Murden traces the rise of modern Western hegemony back to the emergence of the modern nation-state. Western states were able to be players and shape the global economy because they had the knowledge, capability, organization, and credibility. The West has been a dominant force in the international system, but hegemony in the late 20th century "was no longer an extension of the political and military power of the territorial state but was now rooted in global flows of technology, information, knowledge, and economic growth. . . . [I]t was in the realm of the hyper real, cyberspace, and global systems that hegemony was now being made" (p. 7).

As far as modernity and the West are concerned, embracing "globalized modernity" necessarily means accepting at least some elements of Westernization. Global hegemony promotes open-market capitalism and is dominated by Western institutions, norms, and values. In the global age, the world economy is supervised by such Western-dominated institutions as the International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, Group of Seven, North American Free Trade Alliance, and European Union. Muslim states must inevitably function within this global system. On the whole, modern Muslim states participate in the normal functions and conventions of the international system (e.g., membership in the United Nations and the Arab League, recognizing sovereignty). However, this has created what Murden terms a "conceptual chasm between Islamic ideals and Muslim realities." For example, the ideal concept of the *umma*, or Muslim community, was challenged and replaced by the reality of the modern nation-state in the international system. Murden notes that Arab nationalists in the past had issues with the modern state system, and their efforts at Pan-Arabism were not very successful. In another area, the ideal Islamic notion of economic justice in reality stands in opposition to the expansion of free-market capitalism, which is demanded by the Western-dominated international economy.

But despite this, Murden believes that Muslims will remain distinct and the biggest issue facing them in the 21st century will ultimately involve "finding the path to a better modernity." Islamic doctrine gave all fundamentalists plenty of scope to justify drifting back to an authoritarian regime, but the emergence of a more complex and diverse Muslim thought gives an alternative to an Islamic interpretation, which could be more democratic. The core principles of Islam were sacrosanct, but the community could govern itself with a system of justice (*ʿadl*) and consultation (*shūrā*) that might be a very close system to an electoral democracy and human rights. Although Muslim culture embodies the rule of law and humanity, liberal democracy did not flourish in the Islamic culture because of the domination of Muslim societies by authoritarian state elites. Indeed, the Islamic resurgence continued, but the authoritarian state was too strong and the Islamic opposition too divided for revolution to take place. In most places, the state could not be overthrown, but neither could it fully control the Islamists, resulting in a chronic and seemingly endless crisis. Murden terms this "the politics of paralysis." Ultimately, if Muslims were to progress, compromise between the authoritarian state and Islamic militants was necessary. Representative government was the only real option for a resolution to the "politics of paralysis." Murden's advocacy for political democracy as a solution to

bigger problems in the region is laudable. Indeed, the question of governance rests at the heart of many other issues facing Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries.

DOI: 10.1017/S0020743803330211

Yael Navaro-Yashin, *Faces of the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). Pp. 247. \$55.00 cloth; \$21.95 paper.

REVIEWED BY YEŞİM ARAT, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul

By now it is a platitude to claim that social scientists have long underlined the important role of the state in Turkish political life. The “strong Turkish state,” the “centralizing Turkish state,” the “transcendental Turkish state,” the “bourgeois Turkish state” have all been problematized, elaborated, and questioned by students of social studies. However, Yael Navaro-Yashin’s work is the much needed and most welcome anthropological study of the state in Turkey. *Faces of the State*, unlike any other book on the subject, shows us what the state means in people’s lives and how people endorse and cultivate statism in their public life. The author focuses on the issue of secularism that has long defined the state in Turkey, and she interrogates in all its complexity how secularism is lived in private and championed in public in a context of increasing religious observance.

Navaro-Yashin argues that her book is “a study of the production of the political in the public life of Turkey in the 1990s” (p. 2). She breaks new ground in focusing on “public life” rather than an institutional site to locate the political and study the role of the state in shaping or defining the political. “Public life,” as Navaro-Yashin sees it, is a category that allows for observing the political in its multiple, changing, and even ephemeral forms. She is not interested in locating the state in the context of a modernist state-society framework, and she does not engage in a deconstructionist analysis of this dichotomy, which she believes will unduly reproduce the latter. She argues that the political and the state survive deconstruction and that they are re-created and maintained through public life and the “fantasies” people have of the state. “Fantasy,” borrowed from Žižek’s reading of Lacan, is a psychic symptom that survives critique and deconstruction.

Equipped with this analytical framework, Navaro-Yashin locates her study of the political and the state in the context of the dialectic between secularism and Islamism in Turkey. Thus, she can shed unprecedented light on the problem of secularism, its meaning, and its implications. She squarely confronts secularism, perhaps the single most important tool of the modernizing elite in transforming the post-Ottoman polity into a Westernizing, democratizing nation-state, and shows how the tool itself has been transformed into a hegemonic public discourse, a calcified state ideology upheld by a significant constituency. In the first part of her book, which she calls “cultural politics,” Navaro-Yashin studies the secularist projections and fears about “Islamic public life” and the secularist attributions to the Islamists. She has a chapter on the location of Turkish secularism in a Muslim Middle East, which has implications for rethinking borders of Europe as well as Turkey. She introduces us perceptively to the mind set of secularists through the characters, lives, and perceptions of two ordinary middle-class women whose stories reveal the complexities, distances, and unexplored rifts between the two groups. In another piercing chapter, “The Market for Identities: Buying and Selling of Secularity and Islam,” she shows how commodification of their respective cultural icons in Islamist and secularist camps provides the context that ties rather than divides the two.

In the second part of the book, titled “State Fantasies,” she explores how public space helps regenerate and reinvent the state in the everyday practices of ordinary people. In the chapter

“Rituals for the State: Public Statism and the Production of ‘Civil Society,’” she studies how societal practices such as bidding farewell to soldiers and watching soccer cultivate statist norms; in another chapter, “Fantasies for the State: Hype, Cynicism, and Everyday Life of Statecraft,” she argues how the state lives on despite exposure and criticism. Her final chapter is an acute analysis of the “cult of Atatürk” that is still maintained by significant sectors of society. She keenly compares the dedication that some allegedly secular groups have to Atatürk to religious observance. Just as the commodification of culture joins, rather than divides, the religious and secular groups, she perceptively observes, there is a resemblance in their respective modes of worship that brings the two groups together.

Navaro-Yashin develops his argument about “the reproduction of the state through everyday practices” in opposition to claims made by other social scientists that “civil society” developed in the 1980s and 1990s in Turkey. She is skeptical about these claims because she believes that those scholars assume civil society to be independent of and in opposition to the state. She problematizes civil society by questioning its links to the state. In her words, “to complicate the narrative of post-Kemalist scholars of civil society . . . with further ethnographic descriptions,” she picks on the Welfare Party officials’ uses and abuses of the terms “state” and “society.” Welfare Party officials describe themselves as reflecting the “culture of the people” or as “the voice of civil society” (p. 139). At this point, it becomes slightly unclear how the misuse of a term by party officials proves her point about the murky distinction between state and civil society. The party and its officials by definition do not belong to the realm of “civil society” to the extent that this term has a specific social-scientific meaning. It is true that the party represents the “culture of some people,” but the party officials mistakenly or manipulatively identify themselves as part of “civil society.” One wonders whether, to prove her point, it would not be more appropriate to choose an uncontested member of civil society, then show how it is implicated in the state. The Society to Support Civilized Life (*Ça_da_Ya_amı Destekleme Derne_i*), which she does mention but does not examine, could be such an alternative. The association was founded independently of any statist instigation, solely by ordinary secularist women who have thoroughly internalized statist norms and secularism. They are very successful in propagating the statist culture and “reproducing the state in public life.” Navaro-Yashin’s other example is that of the state officials’ mobilizing the people to stage the 1994 celebration of Republic Day—in other words, of the state and its culture. In this case, the state is so explicitly implicated in the organization that the celebration remains a “holiday of the state” rather than a “holiday of society.”

The discussion of civil society is important because civil society provides the public space where the “everyday practices of ordinary people” both “reproduce” at the same time that they set the limits on the reproduction of the state. The book does not take the latter alternative into consideration. However, the latter alternative is a serious consideration that might actually better explain the developments of 2002, when the Islamists came to power despite the fears, projections, and prophecies of the secularists, and the process of democratization unfolded because the people sharing their common public space raised their voices in civil society to join the European Union. In the context of a globalizing world, the state was engaged in both of these developments, but it also reflected the demands of the people for change and not merely the preservation of the statist status quo.

Faces of the State could be better focused, and some parts could better gel together. But Navaro-Yashin is such an acute observer of culture and society that it is a joy to read what she writes. The book contains beautiful, evocative pictures that complement and enhance her observations. *Faces of the State*, with grace and sophistication, fills an important vacuum in the study of Turkish secularism and statist culture. Students of Turkey, the Middle East, politics, anthropology, sociology, and history have a lot to learn from and to enjoy in this wonderful book.

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HOOMAN PEIMANI, *Failed Transition, Bleak Future? War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers). Pp. 163. \$59.95 cloth.

REVIEWED BY NOZAR ALAOLMOLKI, Department of Political Science, Hiram College, Hiram, Ohio

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caucasus and Central Asian regions have emerged as two of the most complex regions in international politics. The emergence of the new republics and their detachment from the communist state and its economic system have brought about a sudden decline in economic conditions and an increase in social problems in most of these countries in addition to the outbreak of ethnic and national conflicts.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the United States' declared "war on terrorism" in Afghanistan and its neighboring countries have changed the political features of the regions covered in this book. The latter-day version of the Great Game in the Caucasus and Central Asia that recently pitted Russia against the West—specifically, the United States—has suddenly become a cooperative venture for the sake of shared interests, chief among which are the joint campaign against "terrorism" and each state's individual war against its own separatist, nationalist, or ethnic movements.

Hooman Peimani, an independent consultant with United Nations agencies in Geneva, provides a brief but useful account of the ongoing developments in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) since their independence. The book's core argument is that the countries under study are plagued by weak economic systems that are deteriorating by the day; by authoritarian leaderships that are distrusted by the population; and by persistent ethnic conflicts, as in Armenia and Azerbaijan. The result, Peimani argues, is that post-Soviet republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, pose a bleak future for peace in Asia, and maybe the world. He contends that "instability in that region could potentially destabilize two continents housing six of the seven declared nuclear states: China, France, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United Kingdom" (p. 1). Judging from the recent crisis between the two nuclear countries of India and Pakistan, such an observation strikes the reader as being rather extreme. One can maintain that the presence of the international forces in the region would make it difficult, if not impossible, for any large-scale military conflict to erupt. Further, it is a fact that the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the crisis in the Farghana Valley between Kyrgyz and Uzbek population, and the civil war in Tajikistan have so far remained confined within national borders.

Failed Transition, Bleak Future is a short and tightly written book divided into six chapters. Peimani examines the political, economic, social, and ethnic problems of individual countries and presents these problems as potential sources of future conflicts within and between the republics that may pull in regional as well as international actors. The book's Introduction presents an overview of the regional problems (i.e., dismal economic conditions, social problems, and the authoritarian nature of the government systems) as the root causes of instability in the region. He further points out that such problems may drag some of these republics into a military conflict that may then expand into a larger military confrontation "in either of the two regions" (p. 2).

Moreover, the author provides a "general overview" of the political, economic, and demographic make-up of the republics in these two regions at the time of their independence, in addition to an analysis of the political developments in Moscow under Mikhail Gorbachev and their consequences throughout the former Soviet republics. Peimani then explains at length the economic, political, and social conditions of the republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia since their independence. The economic data are extensive and useful for further studies of the

countries in the regions. In that connection, Peimani points out that “massive closure of state enterprises in the urban and rural areas created high unemployment and a large decline in the production of industrial and agricultural goods. This situation, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet distribution system, further worsened the chronic shortage of basic products, including foodstuffs, that had been a major characteristic of the Soviet economy” (p. 26). The author also points out the republics’ failure to attract needed Western investment, with the exception of the oil and gas industries of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In addition, Peimani examines ethnic problems, such as that involving the Abkhazians in Georgia, which has resulted in a semi-independent Abkhazia; and that between Armenians and Azerbaijanis over Nagorno Karabakh (the correct rendition of the name is “Nagorno Karabagh,” because “bagh” means garden, vineyard, or orchard), which resulted in a war that is yet to be resolved while Armenia continues to control the disputed enclave. Peimani also presents an analysis of the problems posed by the large ethnic Russian population of Kazakhstan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the Farghana Valley—a 180-mile-long, 40-mile-wide region that accommodates more than 10 million people from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—which he highlights as sources of further instability in Central Asia.

Peimani correctly asserts that authoritarianism is one of the causes of the bleak future for these countries. “A major component of authoritarianism has been a zero-tolerance policy toward meaningful political dissent in any form and any extent on the part of individuals or groups. Religious and nonreligious, including nationalist, groups and individual activists challenging the authority and the legitimacy of the ruling elites have all been targeted” (p. 63). This observation is nothing new, considering that, with the exception of Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan, all of the current leaders of these countries held prominent positions in the former Soviet Communist Party, either at the republic or federal level. Hence, continuation of non-democratic “authoritarian” political systems even in Kyrgyzstan is not surprising. Thanks to repeated amendments of the constitution, Saparmurat Niazov has been made Turkmenistan’s president for life, while Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, Haidar Aliiev of Azerbaijan, and Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan have extended their hold on the office.

The author contends that the worsening corruption and authoritarianism will continue to be sources of instability in the republics, which will in turn fuel existing nationalist sentiments in places such as Abkhazia, Armenia–Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. In regard to the growing sense of nationalism, he points out that “the rise of nationalism in the Caucasian and Central Asian countries has been a very negative phenomenon. Given the various sources of political and ethnic discontent, its emergence has not strengthened these newly independent states. On the contrary, the rise of nationalism in all these countries has contributed to their instability and weakened their social fabric by awakening ethnic rivalry and independence movements” (p. 110). Such an observation, however, is not valid for the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, the Abkhazians in Georgia, or the Russians in Kazakhstan. Moreover, regional developments since 11 September have seriously diminished the threat of the Taliban, the IMU, and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (Uighur) in the Xinjiang Province of China, which are presented in chapter 5 under the title, “Worrisome Trends.”

Peimani argues in conclusion that “[o]ne should hope that, for the sake of peace and stability Iran, China, Turkey, Russia, and the United States will find enough incentives to become contributing partners to a process of economic growth and peaceful resolution of conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Otherwise, there is little doubt that the current pace of events in the two regions is heading toward a period of war and instability, with a devastating result for the exhausted Caucasian and Central Asian countries. This development will contain a great potential for escalation, with severe implications for the security of many other countries in Asia and Europe” (p. 143).

Overall, this is a well-written book that contributes to our understanding of these complex regions. I recommend it for library acquisition.

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BASSAM TIBI, *Islam between Culture and Politics* (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Pp. 288. \$68.00 cloth; 19.95 paper.

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The word "between," in the title of this book also occurs in a dozen of its chapter headings to underline a host of Islam's other unavoidable and unenviable choices between "past and present," "belief and reality," "divine law and spirituality," "secularization and de-secularization," "modernity and neo-absolutism," and so on. Bassam Tibi is himself an in-between observer, not merely because he is a naturalized German citizen of Syrian origin who currently resides in the United States, but mainly because he straddles the disciplines of international relations, Middle East studies, anthropology, and sociology. Based on a unique, interdisciplinary grid of social sciences, Tibi's narrative of Islam in the modern world flows with the confidence of a native's account.

Because Tibi is dissatisfied with the lack of cultural dimension in international studies, he prescribes a dose of anthropological sensibility for capturing the cultural universes that permeate nation-states. He is also impatient with the laid-back relativism and aimless categorizing obsession of anthropology that neglects international contexts, historical backgrounds, and political consequences of cultures. But this is only one of the author's challenges. He also undertakes to integrate and resolve an extraordinary array of diverse ideas, including many of his own, in this volume. To do all this, Tibi should have been more parsimonious, but economy is not a virtue he sets out to exercise. This is evident at the outset of the book, where the reader gets the strange impression of having barged backstage into the author's mind. Tibi's tortuous soliloquy about what he borrows from thinkers such as Clifford Geertz and how he plans to refute or go beyond them is exasperating. The first section of the book (which consists of four master chapters, or "parts") is involuted, with the word "I" on average appearing three times on each page throughout the Introduction and Introductory Remarks, and in the first two sub-headings of the first chapter. In one paragraph on page 20, "I" and "my" occur eleven times each. Repetitions continue throughout the work. One can scarcely find a major idea in the book that is not diminished by recurrences complete with indirect and even direct, indented quotations (e.g., pp. 67 and 174). The unfortunate lapses of style in the beginning chapters of the book will discourage many from continuing to read and benefit from the main arguments advanced by the author. Hence, skipping over the first thirty-seven pages of the book, which are episodic and unnecessary to the main body of the work, is advisable.

Parts 2 and 3 enlarge on the external and internal causes of the politicization of Islam, for which the author uses the now popular term "Islamism." Here, Tibi is judicious and original in his choice of theories to explain the civilizational cleavage between the Muslim world and the West. He critically appraises many social scientists but takes his bearings from a constellation of sociological stars, including Reinhard Bendix, Raymond Aron, Norbert Elias, and Maxime Rodinson. The discussion of theory in the main body of the work is unencumbered by the long monologues that mar the first part of the book. Tibi does not blame the general backwardness of the Muslim world on Western imperialism alone but underlines a number of cultural and civilizational impediments that have precluded modernization and secularization of the Muslim

world. The collapse of the hasty and superficial Westernization of the Muslim world has unleashed a nativist backlash with a de-secularizing bent. All this does not mean that Tibi discounts the role of Western hegemony in the creation of Islamic fundamentalism, which, at least in part, has been a direct response to the humiliations that Muslims have suffered at the hands of Western colonialists and their regional proxies. Although Tibi is critical of the Orientalist tradition's purely philological and non-social-scientific approach in his native Germany, he continues to study fundamentalism as an Islamic phenomenon. A more comparative posture by Tibi would use politicized fundamentalisms in Judaism and Christianity as a backdrop for the study of Islamic fundamentalism. This approach would have gone a long way toward dispelling the Orientalist assumption of the uniqueness of Islam in this regard.

Tibi's original and intriguing insights about the dilemmas facing both Europe and its new migrant Muslims enrich the last chapter of the book, "Islamic Immigration between Cultural Assimilation, Political Integration, and Communitarian Ghettoism." In this grand finale, the author militates—with a social scientist's perspective, a passionate activist's conviction, and a participant observer's authority—for a "Euro-Islam." Muslims in Europe, he avers, must renounce their claim to hegemonic universalism in favor of a pluralistic worldview as long as they call on the West to do the same. They must give up their medieval binary *Weltanschauung* that divides the world into the "House of Islam" and the "House of War." Castigating Europe as a House of War or trying to convert it into a House of Islam (besides being anachronistic and alienating) would be politically suicidal for the new immigrants. Tibi considers those imams who advertise their missionary directive (*dawah*) as Islam's version of inter-cultural dialogue to be engaged in fraud. Every mountebank needs a credulous audience. And here Tibi's incisive critique goes beyond airing the ghetto's dirty laundry. He holds the self-loathing and lazy-minded relativism of Western intellectuals responsible for lionizing the opportunistic exponents of Euro-fundamentalism. "One-way tolerance of anything goes is the tolerance of the loser" (p. 209). But the West will not be the only loser if this dangerous game is allowed to continue. To the extent that politically correct Westerners cuddle neo-absolutist Islamists, migrant Muslims are cheated of the opportunity to face the challenge of modernity. Muslims' interest lies in inter-cultural critique, not in multi-cultural license. The West's uncritical broad-mindedness is detrimental to both native and Muslim Europeans, as it does nothing to prevent the swing of the pendulum from Islam as a spiritual culture to Islam as an armed, oppressive, and theocratic ideology.

Tibi's voice is a significant one in the chorus of Muslim reformers who have renounced politicized Islam and called for a modern, post-Enlightenment reconstruction of the creed. Some of these reformers have gone beyond expressing the wish for a modern understanding of Islam to lay the foundations of a new approach to the holy texts and divine revelation that is reminiscent of Christianity's Higher Criticism. Tibi's stance as an inter-cultural negotiator and an activist, however, is different. He uses his experience as a German Muslim to envision Europe as the incubator of reform Islam. Geographical distance from the motherland, intellectual proximity to the cradle of Enlightenment, and political and cultural contingencies might provide diaspora Muslims with incentive enough to pour old grape juice into new bottles. After all, reform Judaism, a religion similar in many ways to Islam, also got its start in Germany.